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Digital signatures are widely used for authenticity and transferability of messages. Currently used
classical schemes have only computational security. We present an unconditionally secure quantum
signature scheme where all trust assumptions on the quantum channels are removed, which also
has reduced signature size compared to previous quantum schemes. We show that in practice, the
noise threshold for out scheme is less strict than for distilling a highly secure key using quantum key
distribution. This shows that “direct” quantum signature schemes can be preferable to signature
schemes relying on quantum key distribution.
INTRODUCTION
Signature schemes allow for the exchange of messages
from one sender to multiple recipients, with the guaran-
tee that messages cannot be forged or tampered with.
Additionally, messages can be transferred (it is highly
unlikely that a message is accepted by one recipient and
then, if forwarded, rejected by another recipient) and
cannot be repudiated (if a recipient accepts a message,
the sender cannot later successfully deny that she sent it).
Digital signatures are widely used and may be considered
to be one of the most important inventions of modern
cryptography. Unfortunately, the security of commonly
used signature protocols relies on the assumed compu-
tational difficulty of certain problems. In the United
States, for example, there are currently three approved
algorithms for generating digital signatures – RSA, DSA
and ECDSA – all of which rely on the difficulty of finding
discrete logarithms or factoring large primes. With the
advent of quantum computers, such assumptions would
no longer be valid. Due to their importance, it would
be desirable to develop signature schemes with uncondi-
tional or information-theoretic security.
Unconditionally secure “classical” signature schemes
are possible, but need, at the very least, shared secret
keys, unless there is a third party trusted by everybody
(who effectively provides each participant with secret in-
formation) [1–4]. Shared secret keys can of course be
generated by quantum key distribution (QKD), so that
an unconditionally secure signature scheme can proceed
by first generating secret keys via QKD, and then running
e.g. the protocol P2 in [4]. Unconditionally secure “di-
rect” quantum signature schemes proceed without first
distilling highly secure shared secret keys [4–7]. It is
an open question what the best unconditionally secure
signature schemes are, with respect to signature length,
trust assumptions, requirements on communication chan-
nels, etc..
Previous quantum signature schemes [4, 6, 7] improved
on the original Gottesman-Chuang scheme [5] by remov-
ing the need for quantum memory. Alice encoded her
signature into quantum states and sent a copy to both
Bob and Charlie, who were only able to gain partial in-
formation on the overall signature due to the quantum
nature of the states. However, the security analysis as-
sumed authenticated quantum channels that did not al-
low eavesdropping. This strong and unrealistic assump-
tion meant that a potential forger (Bob) only had access
to his own copy of the signature states sent from Alice.
In reality an adversarial Bob would be able to gain extra
information on Alice’s signature through eavesdropping
on the signature states sent from Alice to Charlie.
Here we present a new quantum signature protocol,
with three improvements over previous protocols. First,
we remove all trust assumptions on the quantum chan-
nels. This is crucial for actual practical use of quantum
signature schemes. Second, Alice sends different signa-
tures to Bob and Charlie, instead of the same signature
states, which leads to increased efficiency. Third, we
show that in this direct quantum signature protocol, the
noise threshold for the Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie quan-
tum channels is in practice less strict than for distilling
a secret key using quantum key distribution (QKD).
THE PROTOCOL
We outline our protocol for three parties, with a
sender, Alice, and two receivers Bob and Charlie. Gen-
eralisation to more parties is possible, but special care
should be taken to address colluding adversaries (see e.g.
[8]). We assume that between Alice and Bob and be-
tween Alice and Charlie there exists authenticated clas-
sical channels as well as untrusted, imperfect quantum
2channels. In addition, Bob and Charlie share a QKD
link which can be used to transmit classical messages in
full secrecy. The protocol makes use of a key-generating
protocol (KGP) performed in pairs separately by Alice-
Bob and Alice-Charlie. The KGP uses the noisy un-
trusted quantum channels, and generates two correlated
bit strings, one for the sender and one for the receiver.
The Hamming distance between the receiver’s string and
the sender’s string is smaller than the Hamming distance
between any string an eavesdropper could produce and
the sender’s string. The KGP is further discussed below,
after presenting the signature protocol itself.
The quantum signature protocol has two parts, a
distribution stage and a messaging stage. We show
how to sign a one-bit message. Longer messages can
be signed for example by suitably iterating the one-bit
protocol, as in [9].
Distribution Stage
(1) For each possible future message m=0 or 1, Alice
uses the KGP to generate four different length L keys,
AB0 , A
B
1 , A
C
0 , A
C
1 , where the superscript denotes the
participant with whom she performed the KGP and
the subscript denotes the future message, to be decided
later by Alice. Bob holds the length L strings KB0 ,K
B
1
and Charlie holds the length L strings KC0 ,K
C
1 . Due
to the KGP, we know that AB0 is contains fewer mis-
matches with KB0 than with any string produced by an
eavesdropper, and the same applies to the other pairs of
strings. Alice’s signature for the future message m will
be Sigm = (A
B
m, A
C
m).
(2) For each future message, Bob and Charlie symmetrise
their keys by choosing half of the bit values in their
KBm,K
C
m and sending them (as well as the corresponding
positions) to the other participant using the Bob-Charlie
secret classical channel. As will be explained below, this
ensures that Alice cannot make Bob and Charlie disagree
on the validity of a signature. If they chose to forward a
bit value, they will not further use it to check the valid-
ity of a signature. They will only use the bits they kept
and those received from the other participant [10]. We
denote their symmetrised keys by SBm and S
C
m, with the
superscript indicating whether the key is held by Bob or
Charlie. Bob (and Charlie) will keep a record of whether
an element in SBm came directly from Alice or whether it
was forwarded to him by Charlie (or Bob).
At this point in the protocol, Bob’s and Charlie’s
strings each contain half of KBm and half of K
C
m (in the
honest case). For each future possible message m, Bob
and Charlie each have a bit string of length L, and
Alice has no information on whether it is Bob’s SBm
or Charlie’s SCm which contains a particular element of
the 2L length string (KBm,K
C
m). If Bob is dishonest,
he knows all of KBm and half of K
C
m, but will not know
the half of KCm that Charlie chose to keep. This will
protect against forging by Bob, and vice versa for Charlie.
Messaging Stage
(1) To send a signed one-bit message m, Alice sends
(m,Sigm) to the desired recipient (say Bob).
(2) Bob checks whether (m,Sigm) matches his S
B
m
and records the number of mismatches he finds. He
separately checks the part of his key received directly
from Alice and the part of the key received from Charlie.
If there are fewer than sa(L/2) mismatches in both
halves of the key, where sa < 1/2 is a small threshold
determined by the parameters and the desired security
level of the protocol, then Bob accepts the message.
(3) To forward the message to Charlie, Bob forwards the
pair (m,Sigm) that he received from Alice.
(4) Charlie tests for mismatches in the same way, but
in order to protect against repudiation by Alice he uses
a different threshold. Charlie accepts the forwarded
message if the number of mismatches in both halves of
his key is below sv(L/2) where sv is another threshold,
with 0 < sa < sv < 1/2.
KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL
We now describe how two parties, for now called Alice
and Bob, perform the KGP. Essentially, Alice and Bob
perform the quantum part of QKD to generate raw keys,
but do not proceed to error correction or privacy amplifi-
cation. This means that Alice and Bob will generate dif-
ferent (but correlated) strings that are not entirely secret.
These keys will be the ABi , K
B
i described above. Our aim
is to show that d(ABi ,K
B
i ) < d(E
′,KBi ) except with neg-
ligible probability, where d(., .) is the Hamming distance
and E′ is Eve’s guess (where it may be that Eve is Char-
lie). In what follows, the underlying QKD protocol upon
which the KGP is built will be the prepare-and-measure
decoy-state BB84 protocol using weak coherent pulses,
considered in [11]. Other than the post-processing, the
only difference is that here it is Bob who prepares the
states and sends them along the quantum channel to Al-
ice.
Specifically, we assume that Bob has a phase-
randomised source of coherent states. The intensity of
each light pulse is chosen by Bob to be either u0 (sig-
nal), u1 (decoy 1), or u2 (decoy 2). The intensities are
chosen with probabilities (pu0 , pu1 , pu2). To encode in-
formation, Bob randomly selects one of four possible po-
larisation states – |0Z〉, |1Z〉 (Z basis) and |0X〉, |1X〉 (X
basis). The Z and X bases are chosen with probabilities
pZ ≥ 1/2 and pX ≤ 1/2 respectively. Intensities and
3states are chosen independently by Bob to avoid corre-
lations between intensity and information encoding. If
states are transmitted and then measured in different
bases, they are discarded (sifting). Bob’s key will be the
classical information encoded in states prepared in the Z
basis with intensity u0. Alice’s key will be the results of
her Z basis measurements on states sent with intensity
u0. Decoy state measurements, as well as X basis signal
measurements, are used to parametrise Eve’s possible at-
tack strategies. It should be stressed that in signature
schemes it cannot be assumed that either Alice or Bob
are honest. However, as explained below, neither gain
from dishonesty during the KGP, and therefore we can
assume that they are honest.
In all that follows we will consider the finite case with
Eve restricted to collective attacks, and show that she
is further from Bob’s bit string than Alice. Since we
consider only collective attacks, successive states are in-
dependent. This means that if we can bound Eve’s prob-
ability of making an error on a single element of Bob’s
key given her quantum systems, then we can apply that
bound to all of Bob’s key elements. Therefore, our strat-
egy will be to bound Eve’s uncertainty on a single element
of Bob’s key. We will use that to find a lower bound for
Eve’s probability of guessing Bob’s key element incor-
rectly. Let us denote the ith element of Bob’s key by the
binary random variable Xi. It is shown in [12], [13] that
Eve’s minimum uncertainty (consistent with parameter
estimation) on Xi, given her auxiliary quantum system
Ei, is given by
Hξ(Xi|Ei) := min
σXE∈Γξ
H(Xi|Ei)σ
= Y L0 (u0) + Y
L
1 (u0)[1− h(eUX(1))].
(1)
The set Γξ arises due to the finite number of states used
for parameter estimation. It is defined, as in [14], to be
the set
Γξ ={
σ : ||λm − λ∞|| ≤ ξ :=
√
2 ln(1/ǫPE) + 2 ln(m+ 1)
m
}
,
(2)
where λm are the statistics observed from measurements
onm copies of a state. It contains all states whose asymp-
totic statistics are within ξ of the statistics observed dur-
ing parameter estimation, i.e. it contains all states that
could arise from Eve performing a collective attack con-
sistent with parameter estimation. The actual state held
by Bob-Eve will be in Γξ, except with probability ǫPE .
We say that parameter estimation is successful except
with probability ǫPE .
The terms Y0(u0) and Y1(u0) are the fraction of the
intensity u0 signals reaching Alice, that come from pulses
containing 0 and 1 photons respectively. They are defined
as
Yk(u) =
fke
−u0uk0/k!∑
k fke
−u0uk
0
/k!
, (3)
where fk is the probability that Eve forwards a photon to
Alice if the signal contains k photons. The superscript L
in (1) is included to indicate that we must take the worst-
case (lowest) values consistent with parameter estimation
and the finite number of states (equations (23) and (24)
of [13]).
The quantity eX(1) in Eq. (1) is the bit error rate in X
basis measurements on signal pulses containing a single
photon. The superscript U indicates that we must take
the worst-case (highest) value consistent with parameter
estimation and the finite number of states (equation (25)
of [13]). The terms Y L0 (u0), Y
L
1 (u0) and e
U
X(1) can all be
found using decoy-state techniques.
Eve’s goal is to correctly guess the value of Xi given
her quantum systems E1, ..., EN (where N is the number
of states sent and received). In order to gain information
on Xi, Eve will perform a general collective measurement
on E1, ..., EN to produce E
′, a classical random variable
representing the possible outcomes of the collective mea-
surement. Using results from [15] we find
H(Xi|E1, ..., EN ) = H(Xi|Ei)
≤ H(Xi|E′)
:=
∑
r
P (E′ = r)H(Xi|E′ = r).
(4)
The first equality follows since Eve performs a collective
attack, and so the overall state before Eve’s measurement
will be of product form. The inequality follows (after
some work) from the Holevo bound, and the last equality
follows by definition of the conditional entropy. Note that
for each possible E′ = r, Xi|E′ = r is a classical random
variable with two possible outcomes, and so H(Xi|E′ =
r) must equal the binary entropy, h(pr), for some pr ≤
1/2. Assume that, conditional on Eve’s outcome being
E′ = r, we have Xi = b with probability 1 − pr ≥ 1/2.
Eve’s best strategy is then to guess Xi = b, leading to an
error rate of pr. Eve’s average error probability is
pe =
∑
r
P (E′ = r)pr.
We can use the concavity of the binary entropy, together
with (4), to bound pe as
h(pe) = h
(∑
r
P (E′ = r)pr
)
≥
∑
r
P (E′ = r)h(pr) ≥ H(Xi|Ei).
(5)
Thus Hξ(Xi|Ei) gives us a lower bound on h(pe), and
since the binary entropy is a monotonically increasing
4function for 0 ≤ pe ≤ 1/2, this gives us a lower bound on
pe.
Alice’s Z basis error rates (on signal pulses) with Bob
are estimated directly from parameter estimation as eUZ .
For Alice to be closer to Bob’s string than Eve, we require
that eUZ < pe. If pe, e
U
Z ≤ 1/2, this condition is equivalent
to h(eUZ ) < h(pe), which is satisfied if
Hξ(Xi|Ei)− h(eUZ ) > 0. (6)
If (6) is not satisfied, then Alice and Bob will abort the
protocol. If it is satisfied, then they have the assurance
that pe > e
U
Z , except with probability ǫPE . This allows
us to prove security against forging for the full quantum
signature protocol.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
We will now prove the security of the main signature
protocol, i.e. the robustness (probability of an honest run
aborting), security against forging (probability that a re-
cipient generates a signature, not originating from Alice,
that is accepted as authentic) and repudiation (probabil-
ity that Alice generates a signature that is accepted by
Bob but then when forwarded, is rejected by Charlie). In
what follows we assume that Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie
have each used the KGP to generate length L bit strings
to use in the QDS protocol described above.
Robustness. Bob rejects a signed message if the (1/2)L
bits received from either Alice or Charlie have a mismatch
rate higher than sa with Alice’s signature. For any fixed
choice of parameter ξ > 0, parameter estimation in the
KGP is successful except with probability ǫPE , which
decreases exponentially in the size of the sample used, as
can be seen from (19). Let eUZ,B, e
U
Z,C be the worst-case
Alice error rates with Bob and Charlie respectively. Set
eUZ := max{eUZ,B, eUZ,C} and choose sa such that sa > eUZ .
Using Hoeffding’s inequalities [16], the probability that
Bob will find an error rate higher than sa is bounded by
P(Honest Abort) ≤ 2 exp (−(sa − eUZ )2L)+ 2ǫPE , (7)
where the ǫPE is added to account for a possible failure
of the PE and the factors of 2 are since the abort can be
due to either the states received from Alice or the states
received from Charlie.
Security Against Forging. It is easier for either Bob or
Charlie to forge than for any other external party, and
we will therefore consider forging by an internal party.
In order to forge a message, Bob must give a declara-
tion (m,Sigm) to Charlie that has fewer than sv(L/2)
mismatches with the unknown (to Bob) half of SCm sent
directly from Alice to Charlie, and fewer than sv(L/2)
mismatches with the half he himself forwarded to Char-
lie. An adversarial Bob will obviously be able to meet the
threshold on the part he forwarded to Charlie. We there-
fore consider only the unknown half that was received
directly from Alice. If parameter estimation is successful
in the KGP, then we know the worst-case rates at which
Alice and Bob/Eve will make errors with Charlie’s key;
we denote them eUZ , pe respectively. If the protocol was
not aborted, then eUZ < pe, so we can choose sv such that
eUZ < sv < pe. On each of the L/2 signature elements he
is guessing, Bob will make an incorrect guess with proba-
bility at least pe. Using Hoeffding’s inequalities [16], the
probability that Bob makes fewer than sv(L/2) errors is
bounded by
P(Forge) ≤ exp(−(pe − sv)2L) + ǫPE , (8)
where again the addition of ǫPE is to account for a pos-
sible failure of parameter estimation, in which case the
bound pe > e
U
Z may not hold. Note that security against
an adversarial Bob derives entirely from the Alice-Charlie
KGP, in which Bob is already assumed to be an adver-
sary. Thus, any dishonesty on Bob’s part during the
Alice-Bob KGP is cannot help him to forge.
Security Against Repudiation. Alice aims to send a
declaration (m,Sigm) which Bob will accept and, when
forwarded, Charlie will reject. To do this, we must have
that Bob accepts both the elements that Alice sent di-
rectly to him and the elements that Charlie forwarded
to him. In order for Charlie to reject he needs only re-
ject one of either the elements he received from Alice, or
the elements Bob forwarded to him. Intuitively, security
against repudiation follows because of the symmetrisa-
tion performed by Bob and Charlie using the secret clas-
sical channel. Even if Alice knows and can control the
error rates between ABm, A
C
m and K
B
m, K
C
m, she cannot
control whether the errors end up with Bob or Charlie.
After symmetrisation the keys SBm and S
C
m will each have
the same expected number of errors. To repudiate, one
must contain significantly more errors than the other.
Using results in [17], we can bound this probability as
P(Repudiation) ≤ 2 exp(−(sv − sa)2L/4). (9)
For a more formal proof, please see the supplementary
material. Note that security against repudiation derives
entirely from the symmetrisation performed by Bob and
Charlie, in which Alice plays no part. Even if Alice can
control the choices of sa, sv by manipulating the error
rates achieved during the Alice-Bob KGP and the Alice-
Charlie KGP, the choice of L depends on sa and sv and
the protocol will be secure for any valid choice.
COMPARISON TO QKD
For the finite setting BB84 protocol performed using
decoy states as described above, [13] gives the secret key
rate (per state sent and received in the Z basis) as
r = Hξ(Xi|Ei)− (LeakEC +∆)/n, (10)
5where n is the number of states sent and measured in
the Z basis, and ∆ is a constant depending on the prob-
abilities of failure for PE, error correction and privacy
amplification. The term LeakEC depends on the imple-
mentation of error correction, but must be greater or
equal to the asymptotic value of nh(eUZ ). In practice, er-
ror correction will not be perfect and it is common to
write LeakEC = nfECh(e
U
Z ) where fEC is a leakage pa-
rameter. To perform error correction, the total key is
split into blocks and the leakage parameter, fEC , de-
pends on this block size, but not the overall length of the
key. Increasing the block size reduces fEC at the cost of
decreasing the efficiency of the error correction protocol.
Estimates of fEC for practically feasible error correction
is an area of active research [18], though it is commonly
estimated to be in the range 1.11− 1.2, regardless of the
length of the total key being distilled. For example, [14]
assumes fEC = 1.2 based on the performance of error
correcting codes in use at ID Quantique. Rewriting (10),
we get
r = Hξ(Xi|Ei)− fECh(eUZ )−
∆
n
. (11)
Comparing equations (6) and (11), we immediately see
that there are channels for which quantum signatures
are possible and yet practical QKD is not. As stated
above, fEC is independent of n and so cannot be de-
creased by simply increasing the size of the total key.
The important point is that because the quantum signa-
ture scheme omits the inefficient process of error correc-
tion, there should always be some region where quantum
signatures is possible but QKD is not.
DISCUSSION
In this paper we have presented a quantum uncondi-
tionally secure signature protocol which improves on pre-
vious quantum signature protocols by removing all trust
assumptions on the quantum channels between partici-
pants. One could expect that by removing strong trust
assumptions (authenticated quantum channel) the effi-
ciency of the protocol would decrease. In fact the oppo-
site is true – our protocol significantly reduces the length
of the signature needed to sign a message. Finite sample
size effects mean that it is inefficient to use the KGP to
generate small keys (although it is possible for sample
size as small as O(105) [11]). Instead, we use the KGP to
generate long strings which are split up and used to sign
more than one message [19]. In this case, the values of
pe and e
U
Z must be slightly increased to account for fur-
ther finite size variations (see supplementary material).
To compare with previous papers, we say the protocol is
secure if the probabilities in (20), (25), (24) are all be-
low 10−4. Using realistic experimental assumptions, we
estimate that by running the KGP long enough to gen-
erate a reasonable number of counts, a signature length
of L = 3.5 × 105 is necessary to securely sign a single
half bit over a distance of 50 km. This would require
Bob/Charlie to transmit approximately 9.35× 108 states
to Alice during their KGP’s. We compare this to previ-
ous quantum signature protocols which required O(1010)
states to be transmitted to achieve the same level of se-
curity over 1 km [20].
The increase in efficiency is largely due to the fact that
in our protocol Alice sends different states to Bob and
Charlie, whereas in previous protocols she sent them the
same states. In those protocols, even without any eaves-
dropping, a potential forger had access to a legitimate
copy of each of the states Alice sent to the participants
and thus to reach same levels of security required longer
signatures. Moreover, when generalising to N partici-
pants with up to t dishonest parties, potential forgers
are even more powerful, since we need to assume they
have t legitimate copies of each state. In our protocol,
where we send different states to each participant, this
problem is evaded. The only source of information for
a potential forger is by eavesdropping on the quantum
channels, an activity bypassed in previous protocols due
to the assumption of “authenticated” quantum channels.
We note here that our analysis considered only the sce-
nario where Eve is restricted to collective attacks. For
QKD it is shown that due to the symmetry of BB84, it is
sufficient to consider only those attacks that leave Alice-
Bob with a convex combination of product states [22].
We therefore conjecture that our protocol will be secure
even against coherent attacks [23], but leave a rigorous
proof for future work.
In this paper we showed that the noise threshold in
the quantum channels connecting Alice-Bob and Alice-
Charlie is less strict for quantum signatures than for dis-
tilling a secret key using QKD in practice. For some
quantum channels, therefore, quantum signature proto-
cols that use QKD (e.g. P2 of [4]) are not possible, while
our direct quantum protocol remains possible. This is an
example that direct quantum protocols are sometimes
preferrable, and highlights that there is a lot more in
quantum signatures than a simple application of QKD.
The authors would like to thank Vedran Dunjko for
discussions. This work was supported by the UK En-
gineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EP-
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MP1006. A.K. was partially supported by a grant from
FQXi and by Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics.
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Province of Ontario through the Ministry of Research
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KEY GENERATION PROTOCOL
Equation 1
In the entanglement-based view of the protocol, as in equation (8) of [12], Bob prepares the states
|Ψj〉ABR1 =
∑
n≥0
√
pn|Ψnj 〉AB |n〉R1 (12)
Where j = X,Z represents the choice of basis and |Ψnj 〉AB = 1/
√
2(|0〉B|0j〉⊗nA + |1〉B|1j〉⊗nA ). The system R1 keeps
track of how many photons are contained in the pulse sent by Bob. As in [12], we assume an uncalibrated device
scenario (all errors/losses are attributed to Eve) and the squashing model for Alice’s detectors (which, for BB84 was
proven to exist in [25]). Under these assumptions, we can assume that, after interaction, Eve forwards a single photon
state to Alice so that the state shared by Alice and Bob is a two qubit state. Bob can then perform an X or Z basis
measurement to prepare Alice’s system at a distance. Alice will also make the usual X or Z basis measurements.
Under the assumption of collective attacks, Eve performs the same unitary to each state and so after transmission
(but before measurements) the state is
|χ〉ABER1R2 =
∑
j
AjUAE(|Ψj〉ABR1 |0〉E)|j〉R2 (13)
Where Aj is the operation performed by Alice on single qubit states (AZ = IA and AX = H , where H is the Hadamard
transformation). The system R2 keeps track of the basis used by Bob to encode information. We aim to find Eve’s
uncertainty on X , a random variable representing the outcome of a Z-basis measurement made by Bob on his system.
That is, we aim to find H(X |E, j = Z). As in [12], we find
H(X |E, j = Z) ≥
∞∑
n=0
P (n)H(X |E, n, j = Z) (14)
Where H(X |E, n, j = Z) is the uncertainty Eve has on the outcome of Bob’s Z-basis measurement, given there were
n photons in the pulse Bob sent to Alice. In the main paper, we do not explicitly write j = Z since it is stated that
Bob’s key comes from Z-basis measurements. We consider three different cases.
• For n > 1 Eve has full information on the outcome of Bob’s measurement, and so H(X |E, n > 1, j = Z) = 0.
• For n = 1, Bob sends a single photon pulse to Alice and we are in the usual single photon QKD scenario. We
use standard results in QKD (see, for example, Appendix A of [21]) to say Eve’s uncertainty is H(X |E, n =
1, j = Z) = 1− h(eX(1)).
• For n = 0, Bob sends nothing along the quantum channel, so Eve has full uncertainty on the outcome of Bob’s
measurement, so H(X |E, n = 0, j = Z) = 1 as shown in [26].
As a last step, we must minimise H(X |E, j = Z) over all possible states consistent with the parameters estimated
by Alice and Bob. This gives equation (1) of the main paper.
7Alternative Strategy
We take this opportunity to mention a possible improvement to the bound on Eve’s average error probability.
Using the argument in equation (5) of the main paper, we can show that Eve’s average error probability when
guessing the value of Xi is at least pe, where h(pe) ≥ H(Xi|Ei)σ, where σ is the state in Γξ minimising H(Xi|Ei)σ.
We assume the worst case scenario and take h(pe) = H(Xi|Ei)σ. Consider instead if we were to estimate Eve’s error
probability given a pulse containing n photons. Let qn be the bound on average error probability that Eve has when
guessing the value of X , given the pulse contained n photons - i.e. qn is such that h(qn) = H(X |E, n)σ. Note that
qn = 0 for n > 1. Eve’s overall error rate would be
q = P (n = 0)q0 + P (n = 1)q1
and so
h(q) = h(P (n = 0)q0 + P (n = 1)q1) ≥ P (n = 0)h(q0) + P (n = 1)h(q1) = h(pe)
Note that in fact the first inequality is strict as long as neither q0 nor q1 is zero. Therefore, this method actually
gives a better estimate of Eve’s average error rate. The former method is used however to highlight similarities
with QKD, as well as to avoid difficulties in optimising Eve’s strategy. Namely, it may be that under this analysis
the collective attack represented by σ is not actually optimal for Eve. Instead, an attack giving a larger average
uncertainty may actually lead to fewer errors with Bob’s key. Nevertheless, pe will still hold as an overall lower bound.
Equation 4
We start from equation (13) above. The overall state shared by Alice, Bob and Eve is the product state
|χ〉〈χ|⊗N . The state held by Alice and Bob is the two qubit state ρ⊗NAB obtained by tracing out systems E, R1 and
R2. Following their measurements, Alice and Bob share the state σ
⊗N
YX , and the Bob-Eve state can be written σ
⊗N
XE .
Let us denote the ith element of the product state by σXiEi . Since we have a product state, it is easy to verify using
the definition of the quantum conditional entropy that
H(Xi|E)σ⊗N = H(Xi|Ei)σ (15)
This gives us the first equality in equation (4) of the main paper.
To see the inequality, consider that the maximum amount of information Eve can gain on Xi from measurements
on E1, ..., EN is quantified by the accessible information:
Iacc = max
Λ
I(Xi;E
′) (16)
where E′ represents the classical random variable induced by the measurement Λ, and the maximisation is over all
possible collective measurements on E1, ..., EN . A useful upper bound on the accessible information is the Holevo
quantity which, for classical quantum states, is given by the quantum mutual information [15], I(Xi;E1, ..., EN ). So
we have
I(Xi;E1, ..., EN ) ≥ Iacc = max
Λ
I(Xi;E
′) (17)
From the definitions of quantum mutual information and conditional quantum entropy, (17) implies
H(Xi|E1, ..., EN ) ≤ H(Xi|E′) (18)
This gives the inequality in equation (4).
QDS PROTOCOL SECURITY PROOFS
Robustness
Bob aborts if either the (1/2)L states received from Alice have an error rate higher than sa or the (1/2)L states
received from Charlie have error rate higher than sa. Parameter estimation in the KGP is successful except with
probability ǫPE , which decreases exponentially in the size of the sample used, according to
ǫPE = (m+ 1)e
− 1
2
mξ2 , (19)
8where m is the sample size. Let eUZ,B, e
U
Z,C be Alice’s worst case Z basis error rates found during PE with Bob and
Charlie respectively. Set eUZ := max{eUZ,B, eUZ,C}. Choose sa such that sa > eUZ ; then, using Hoeffding’s inequalities
[16], the probability that Bob will find an error rate higher than sa is bounded by
P(Honest Abort) ≤ 2 exp (−(sa − eUZ )2L)+ 2ǫPE . (20)
The ǫPE is added to account for the possibility of failure of PE. The factors of 2 arise due to the possibility of abort
due to either the states received from Alice or the states received from Charlie.
Repudiation
Alice aims to send a declaration (m,Sigm) which Bob will accept and which Charlie will reject. For this to happen,
Bob must accept both the elements that Alice sent directly to him, and the elements that Charlie forwarded to him.
In order for Charlie to reject he need only reject either the elements he received from Alice, or the elements Bob
forwarded to him (or both). Intuitively, security against repudiation follows because of the symmetrisation performed
by Bob and Charlie using the secret classical channel. In the distribution stage, to send the future message m, Alice
will use the KGP with Bob and Charlie so that they hold the strings (b1, ..., bL) and (c1, ..., cL) respectively. We
give Alice full power and assume that later on, in the messaging stage, she is able to fully control the number of
mismatches her signature declaration contains with (b1, ..., bL) and (c1, ..., cL). Call the mismatch rates eB and eC
respectively. Now, the symmetrisation process means that Bob and Charlie will randomly (and unknown to Alice)
receive L/2 elements of the of the other’s string. We aim to show that any choice of eC , eB leads to an exponentially
decaying probability of repudiation.
Suppose eC > sa: In this case, Bob is selecting (without replacement) L/2 elements from the set {c1, ..., cL},
which contains exactly eCL mismatches with Alice’s future declaration. The number of mismatches Bob selects then
follows a hypergeometric distribution H(L, eCL,L/2) with expected value eCL/2. In order to accept the message,
Bob must select fewer than saL/2 errors. Using [17] we can bound the probability that Bob selects fewer than saL/2
mismatches as
P(Bob receives fewer than saL/2 mismatches from Charlie) ≤ exp(−(eC − sa)2L). (21)
To repudiate, Alice must make Bob accept the message, which means Bob must accept both the part received from
Alice and the part received from Charlie. Since P(A ∩B) ≤ min{P(A),P(B)} the probability of repudiation must be
less than or equal to the above expression, and so must also decrease exponentially.
Suppose eC ≤ sa: In this case, if eB > sa, the above argument shows that it is highly likely that Bob will
reject the message, so we consider only the case where eB ≤ sa. Consider first the set {b1, ..., bL}. We can use the
same arguments as above to bound the probability of selecting more than svL/2 mismatches as
P(Charlie selects more than svL/2 mismatches from Bob) ≤ exp(−(sv − eB)2L). (22)
Alice succeeds if Charlie selects more than svL/2 mismatches from either the set {b1, ..., bL} or the set {c1, ..., cL}.
Using P(A ∪B) ≤ P(A) + P(B), we can see that, for the choice of eB, eC ≤ sa, we have
P(Charlie selects more than svL/2 mismatches) ≤ 2 exp(−(sv − sa)2L). (23)
So again, the probability of Alice successfully repudiating decreases exponentially in the size of the signature. Similar
to [4], Alice’s best strategy would be to pick eB = eC =
1
2
(sv + sa), in which case
P(Repudiation) ≤ 2 exp
(
−1
4
(sv − sa)2L
)
(24)
Forging
In order to forge a message, Bob must give a declaration (m,Sigm) to Charlie that has fewer than sv(L/2) mismatches
with the unknown (to Bob) half of SCm sent directly from Alice to Charlie, and fewer than sv(L/2) with the half
he himself forwarded to Charlie. We can assume that Bob will make fewer than sv(L/2) errors on the half that he
forwarded to Charlie, and we consider only the unknown half. If parameter estimation is successful in the KGP,
9then we know the worst-case rates at which Alice and Bob/Eve (Charlie) will make errors with Charlie’s (Bob’s)
key; denote them eUZ , pe respectively. If the protocol was not aborted, then e
U
Z < pe, so we can choose sv such that
eUZ < sv < pe. On each of the L/2 signature elements he is guessing, Bob will make an incorrect guess with probability
pe, independent of all other guesses (since we consider only collective attacks). Using Hoeffding’s inequalities [16],
the probability that Bob makes fewer than sv(L/2) errors is bounded by
P(forge) ≤ exp(−(pe − sv)2L) + ǫPE . (25)
The addition of ǫPE is to account for the possibility that parameter estimation fails, in which case the bound pe > e
U
Z
may not hold. Note that for simplicity we did not consider the scenario where Charlie is the forger, but it can be
seen that exactly the same argument applies.
Parameters and Constraints
The correctness and security of the protocol depends on the three equations (20), (24) and (25), which in turn depend
on the choice of parameters sa and sv. The parameters must be such that e
U
Z < sa < sv < pe. Here, and in all
that follows, eUZ is the maximum of the worst-case error rates Alice makes with Bob’s key (found from the Alice-Bob
KGP), and the worst-case error rates Alice makes with Charlie’s key (found from the Alice-Charlie KGP). Similarly,
pe is the minimum of the eavesdroppers error rates found from the Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie KGP. The aim is to
choose the parameters which minimise the value of the overall signature length, L.
In the next section, we will calculate the length of the signature necessary to sign a message with a security level
of 10−4. By this, we mean that the probabilities of honest abort, repudiation and forging, given respectively by (20),
(24) and (25), are all less than 10−4. To find the length of the signature necessary to securely sign a half bit, we must
first choose the parameters sa and sv. Ideally, our choice would minimise the total length of the signature, L. For
simplicity, we choose to make ǫPE small, ǫPE = 10
−6, so that we can neglect the possibility of PE failing. Since there
seems no reason to prioritise one security over any other, we choose sa and sv so as to make the exponential terms in
(20), (24) and (25) all (approximately) equal. This means that
sa = e
U
Z +
pe − eUZ
4
, sv = e
U
Z +
3(pe − eUZ )
4
. (26)
Nevertheless, it can be seen that if a certain application desires a higher security against one particular threat (e.g.
forging), it is simple to choose the parameters to prioritise security against that threat.
CALCULATION OF SIGNATURE LENGTH
In this section, we use experimental data provided by [11] to give a rough estimate the number of states that Bob
needs to transmit over the quantum channel to securely sign a half bit at 50km. We set ǫPE = 10
−6 in all equations
that follow. The experiment in [11] approximately achieves the values
• Basis probabilities: pZ = 93.75%, pX = 6.25%.
• Intensity levels: (u0, u1, u2) = (0.425, 0.0435, 0.0022).
• Detection rates per qubit sent: Ru0 = 4.82× 10−3, Ru1 = 7.45× 10−4, Ru2 = 3.01× 10−4.
• Error rates (per detected qubit): eu0X = 0.0364, eu1X = 0.146, eu2X = 0.333, eu0Z = eZ = 0.0426 (for the Z basis
error rates we drop the superscript as we are only interested in signal pulse error rates).
LetNZ,ui be the number of counts registered in the Z basis for intensity ui. If we choose intensities with probabilities
pu0 = 88%, pu1 = 8% and pu2 = 4%, then if we send 10
13 states in total (which would take under 3 hours), we expect
to get NZ,u0 = 3.73× 1010, NZ,u1 = 5.24× 108, NZ,u2 = 1.06× 108 and NX,u0 = 1.65× 108.
Let us define
ξ(m, 2) :=
1
2
√
2 ln(1/ǫPE) + 2 ln(m+ 1)
m
and
p(k|ui) = e−ui u
k
i
k!
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Using [13] we can use these to estimate Y L0 (u0), Y
L
1 (u0) and e
U
X(1). Note that we use the approximation that u2 is
the vacuum intensity. In practice, with high rate sources it is difficult to reduce the intensity down to exactly the
vacuum, and there is often a small residual intensity. Nevertheless the following analysis should give good results.
Equation (18) of [13]:
f0 = Ru2 (27)
Equation (19) of [13]:
f1 =
1
u0 − u1
[
Ru1
u0
p(1|u1) −Ru0
u1
p(1|u0)
]
− f0u0 + u1
u1u0
(28)
Note that these estimates should include finite size variations. However, we follow [13] in making the simplifying
approximation that the fk are as above (the asymptotic values), and we add finite size fluctuation terms onto the
Yk(ui) = p(k|ui)fk, given below. For reasonably large count samples (as considered here) this should be a good
approximation. Equation (23) of [13]:
Y L0 (ui) = [p(0|ui)Ru2 − ξ(NZ,u2 , 2)] /Rui (29)
Equation (24) of [13]:
Y L1 (ui) = [p(1|ui)f1 − ξ(NZ,ui , 2)] /Rui (30)
Equation (25) of [13], with u0 chosen as the signal intensity:
eUX(1) =
eu0,UX − Y L0 (u0)eu2,LX
Y L
1
(u0)
(31)
Where eu0,UX = e
u0
X + ξ(NX,u0 , 2) and e
u2,L
X = e
u2
X + ξ(NZ,u2 +NX,u2 , 2).
Using these equations together with equation (1) of the main paper, we find
Hξ(Xi|Ei) = 0.392 (32)
This gives pe = 7.71%. Further, if we used 10
8 states of the Z basis signal pulse counts to estimate eZ , then
eUZ = eZ + ξ(10
8, 2) = 4.3%. This bound holds except with probability ǫPE . These hold as error rates over the
entire 3.73× 1010 key generated. If we are to split this key into chunks of length 3.5× 105, we must make additional
finite size estimates. Namely, we must decrease pe by ξ(3.5 × 105, 2) and increase eUZ by ξ(3.5 × 105, 2) where
ξ(3.5 × 105, 2) = 6.16× 10−3. This gives our new estimates for Alice and Eve’s worst case error rates as p˜e = 7.09%
and e˜UZ = 4.92%. For these new error rates, the protocol is secure for L = 3.5 × 105. This means that from the
3.73 × 1010 key bits generated, we can sign 1.07 × 105 messages. Since we originally sent 1013 states, this means it
takes 9.35× 108 states sent to securely sign a single bit over 50km.
It should be stressed that this analysis is rough, and has not been optimised. Using the statistical techniques in
[11] could significantly increase the quoted rates. Further, if we instead use the method suggested in the “Alternative
Strategy” subsection above, we would find Eve’s error rate (on Bob’s entire key) to be pe = 10.2%, a significant
improvement.
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